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ristin Shrader-Frechette's concern for distinguishing between seienee and scientists' judgments abaut public poliey raises an important issuc. Indced, the National Research Council (~RC) Committee on the Technical Bases for Yucca Ivlountain Standards (which I chaired, although I am writing now as an individual) went out of its way co point Out where ir believed scienc~ ended and poliey began. ShraderFrechette concludcs that the committee went a coupte of steps too far in recommending thc use of individual risk racher than individual dose as a basis for thc standard .md in making judgments abaut the geology of the region. In my view her arguments do not withstand careful scrutinv, First, shc arglles that a dose standard mal' be more proteetive of public health than a risk standard. This conclllsion is incorrect. Consiuer the definition of the terms as used in the NRC fepott (NRC 1995, p. 72 
):
• Dose is the measure of the radiation receiveu or abwrbed by a target. The unit of dose is the Sievert, which aceounts for both the amount anu quality of radiation absorbed.
• Risk is the probability of an individual reeeiving an adverse healch eHeet (a fatal cancer, in chis case) as a eonsequence of receiving a dose. Spceifically, thc committee deiines risk as the expected vatu~ of ehe proba bilistic distribution of health effeets.
The calculation of risk therefore requires developing a distribution of doses that rnight be received by indivi duals, taking into accOllnt a11 of the cvents that go into determining the likelihood that a dose is reeeived. Shrader-Frechette also argues that measured dose "often may be" more protective than calcula ted risk. For this statement to he relevant, one would have CO be able to measure the dose. In thc case of a repository, from which releases \vi11 only oceur far in ehe future, measuring future doses now, when the decisions must be made, is just not passible. Therefore, risk and the expecced value of dose, CO which risk is direcrly related, are thc ol1ly diteee alrern;rives for setting a health-based standard for judging complianee beiore a facility is actually huilt. Further, contrary to Shrader-Frechetre's assertion, calculation of either expected dose or risk entails assumptions about the future and m.odeling, and neither has an advantage over the other of immunit)' from the potential for manipulation. The calculations are equivalent, with only a COllstant, which is not subject to manipulation, between them. Risk both has more information in it and is more understandable, and therefore should be prderred if puhlic understanding and acceptance are important for standard setting.
Shrader-Frechcttc's second example of supposedly inappropriate subjcctivity in tlle NRC report has to do with the committee's conduslon that the ullderlymg geologie regin1e at Yucca .Mountain is sufficiently stable to permit assessment of repository performance aver aperiod of up to approximately 1 million years. She cites a 1992 peer review report that asserts that "projeetions of the rates of teetonie aetivity and volcanism, as well as natural resouree occurrenee and value, will bc fraught wirh substantial uncertainties that cannot be quantified using standard statistieal methods" (Albrecht et a1.
1992, p. B-2)
. Based on this apparent difference of view, shc suggests [hat the committee should have done more co "distinguish seienee from educated guesses and subjectivc opinions."
The issue is not educated guesses or subjective opinions bur expert judgement, responsibly informed by current scientific knowledge. That projecting the occurrence of teetanie activity and volcanism entails uncerrainty is dear. The NRCcommittee's conclusion, however, i5 not that the timing of these events can be predicted, bur that "the probabilities and consequcnces oi modifications genera ted by climate change, seismic activity, and vakanie eruptiollS are sufficiently boundable ro be included in performance assessments over periods of the order of 1 0 6 years" (NRC 1995,p. 91) . ThediHercnee between predieting geologie aetivity and bounding the eonsequcnees is erucial, partieularly in light of the different time seales underlying the citation on whieh Shrader-frechette relies and the rceommendation of the NRC eommittee.
Albrecht et a1. (1992) reaehed their conclusion in the eontext of the EPA generie standard for high-level radioaetive waste repositories that was then in eHeet. This standard requircd the assessment of releases up to a point in time 10,000 years from the closure of the repository. The NRC report, however, recommends making the assessment up to the time in the future when the computed risk is thc highest (a reeommendation that Shrader-Freehette at onc point applauds). This maximum-risk point is plausibly weil beyond the 10,000-year limit. The question, then, is what kinds of information are needed to judge whether the repository will contain the wastes over a 10,000-
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year period or what the maximum risk might be from releases when they oecur.
The ease of seismie and volcanie events is a good illustration of how specifying a time limit such as 10,000 years aerually can increase uncertainties. Evaluating the state of the repository at a speeifie point in time requires saying something precise about when these events might oceur. Will there be a seismie event of importanee for the repository system in the next 10,000 years? Beeause the timing of these events is uncertain, a performance assessment that relies on predieting them may also be uneertain.
Shifting the basis of performance assessment to a probabilistic analysis of risk whenever the greatest risk might oceur, as the NRC committee recommended, does not require projeetions of thc timing of events. It does require that the probabilities and thc consequenees of thc oceurrence of these events be bounded. And it is this "boundedness" that our committee found to be suffieient to allow lang-term performance assessment to proceed because thc fundamental charaeceristics of the geologie regime at Yucca Mountain most likrly will not change over the next million years.
Nevertheless, it must be obvious that all of the scientific da ta that it would be desirable to have for rnaking intelligent decisions ahout a repository do not exist. The NRC eommittee recognized that expert judgment would be required in such cases. Shrader-Frcehette implies criticism of thc NRC report as requiring a re1iance in part on expert judgment, eiting Albrecht et a1. (1992) , yet she fails to acknowledge thac the latter report comes to the same eonclusion.
Shrader~Freehette has quoted all but one sentenee from the only paragraph in the consensus statement in Albrecht et a1. (1992) that hears on risk. The sentenee following the quotation goes on to say that these "issues will have to be decided bv expert panels thac would ser~e to synthesize diverse information and make educated infercnces based on the available data" (p. B-2). That sounds rather like the "educated guesses" for which she eritieizes the NRC report. Seleetive citation is just the sort of thing that really does give seienee a black eye.
More important, the NRC report ealls attention to the crucial distinetion between seientific and polie)' judgments. Expert seientifie judgrnent will inevitably be necessary on scientific matters, but policy juJgments should be made by poliey makers aeting in the public arena, not scientists eonsulted for thcir seienti fic expertise.
